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Comments on Sally V. and W. Thomas Mallison's Paper: 
The Naval Practices of Belligerents in World War II: 
Legal Criteria and Developments 
by 
w. J. Fenrick * 
Some Reflections on History and Law 
One of the primary purposes of the law of anned conflict is to minimize net 
human suffering. The law must be both relevant and usable. A body oflaw which 
sets irrelevant or impossible standards may allow lawyers and diplomats to 
indulge in mutual self congratulation but it will be of little use to those very 
practical men, the commanders of naval forces engaged in combat. It is not 
essential that international law, to be valid, should always be compatible with 
state practice. If, however, the law of naval warfare is to have an impact on the 
conduct of warfare, there should be a crude congruence between law and 
practice so that it is marginal, extreme conduct which is condemned, not 
activities which are routine operations of war. 
In this area of law, history compels agreement with the remarks of Julius 
Stone: 
It is idle to seek to reduce this matter to a cri de coeur of humanity. War law, even 
at its most merciful, is no expression of sheer humanity, save as adjusted to the 
exigencies of military success, a truth as bitter (but no less true) about attacks on 
merchant ships, as about target area saturation bombing. And it is also quite idle 
for Powers whose naval supremacy in surface craft enable them to pursue the aim 
of annihilating the enemy's seaborne commerce without "sink at sight" warfare, 
to expect that States which cannot aspire to such supremacy will refrain from 
seeking to annihilate that commerce by such naval means available to them as 
submarines, aircraft and mines. To refuse to face this will save neither life nor ship 
in any future war; and it will also forestall the growth of real rules for the mitigation 
of suffering under modern conditions. 1 
Up until the Second World War, it appears to have been in fashion for 
international lawyers to write books reviewing state practice and compliance 
with international law in particular conflicts. For example, an American profes-
sor, Amos Hershey, published The IntemationalLAw and Diplomacy if the Russo 
Japanese War in 1906, and James Wilford Gamer, another American professor, 
published his two volume study, International LAw and the World War in 1920. 
Such books appear to have gone out offashion since the Second World War.J. 
M. Spaight, a British civil servant, published the third edition of his Air Power 
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and War Rights in 1947 and this book provides a usable, albeit not comprehensive, 
survey of state practice in air warfare. The apparent demise of the genre is 
unfortunate as the authors of these books at least identified the legal issues 
although their legal reasoning was often somewhat partisan. 
One, but hopefully not the only, indicator of the relevance of law to state 
practice in naval warfare during the Second World War is the body of work 
published by naval historians. The practice oflaw requires lawyers to develop 
reasonably thick skins. This is fortunate because the references of naval historians to 
the law of naval warfare and to the 1936 London Protocol in particular are less than 
flattering. Theodore Roscoe, for example, in his semi-official 1949 book, United 
States Submarine Operations in World War II, indicates that all United States Navy 
submarines were supplied with a small volume entitled "Instructions for the 
Navy of the United States Governing Maritime and Aerial Warfare" which 
required compliance with the London Protocol. After Pearl Harbor, however, 
submarines were ordered to wage unrestricted warfare as a reprisal. Roscoe goes 
on to say: 
In any event, realistic thinking demanded recognition of the fact that a nation's 
economic forces and its fighting forces bear the inseparable relationship of Siamese 
twins. Any reduction of a nation's economic resources weakens its war potential. 
Sever the commercial arteries of a maritime nation and its industrial heart must 
fail, while the war effort expires with it. Therefore, it was not reprisal so much as 
military imperative that caused Washington to reverse its opinion on the already 
abrogated naval laws. 
Webster defines a merchant vessel as "a ship employed in commerce." There were 
to be no merchant ships in the Pacific for the duration of the war - cargo carriers 
were merchantmen by genesis only. The u.S. Navy was to consider allJapanese 
shipping as engaged in prosecution of the war effort - either carrying men, 
munitions, and equipment to areas under attack or occupation, or freighting home 
the plundered raw materials from conquered territory. 
Armed or not, these merchantmen were in effect combatant ships. "Transports," 
"freighters," "tankers" were hollow tides for auxiliaries of war, and it was the 
realistic duty of the submarine forces to reduce these ships to hulls as hollow as 
their tides. The polite litde law book went overboard. Converted by a directive 
into commerce raiders, American submarines in the Pacific went to war to sink 
everything that floated under a Japanese flag.2 
Roscoe's somewhat cavalier approach to the law of armed conflict is more 
common among naval historians than most lawyers would like to think. 
Historians do, however, on occasion raise issues which international lawyers 
must advert to if they wish to assess the law in something other than a legal 
vacuum. Professor Talbott's thoughtful study, Weapons Development, War Plan-
ning and Policy: the US Navy and the Submarine, 1917-41, argues that the United 
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States Navy had in fact made the decision to wage unrestricted submarine 
warfare in the Pacific if war occurred some time before the attack on Pearl 
Harbor. In his view, technology drove policy. The actual decision of the United 
States to wage unrestricted submarine warfare after Pearl Harbor was less 
significant than: 
the decision to build a long-range submarine, the resolution of the technical 
problems that such a project raised, and the decision to pursue a strategy of 
economic warfare. The history of submarine development also affinns that when 
the responsible authorities find in their hands a weapon that promises to make the 
waging of war more efficient, they will use it.3 
Perhaps the impressionistic observations of the late D. P. O'Connell concerning 
the role of law in naval warfare, albeit somewhat modest, are as accurate as 
any: 
The only prediction that can be made with assurance is that the lower the level 
of conflict, the more localized the situation and the more restricted the objectives, 
the more predominant will be the element of law in the governing of naval 
conduct; and that the law will assume a diminished role - as it did in the Second 
W orId War - when the conflict becomes global, when the neutrals have been 
mosdy drawn into it or their sympathies engaged, and when an element of 
desperation has entered into operational planning.4 
It would appear that no nation had a monopoly on atrocities during the 
Second World War although, depending on national perspectives, some 
atrocities might be referred to as regrettable incidents. In addition to the 
somewhat questionable "LAconia incident"S and the Battle of the Bismark Sea 
killings referred to by Professor Mallison, there is some indication that the crew 
of the US submarine Wahoo massacred thousands of survivors of a Japanese troop 
transport in early 1943 and the Wahoo's commanding officer, who reported the 
incident, was decorated for it.6 Although the German and Japanese appear to have 
provided all of the accused in naval war crimes trials, there is also some indication 
that on a few occasions the British deliberately attacked the shipwrecked, 
particularly during unsuccessful efforts to defend against the German invasion of 
Crete? These occasional tragic incidents notwithstanding, there has been no 
suggestion that attacks on the shipwrecked should be legally permissible. 
There is also little doubt that those belligerents with the capability and 
requirement to do so engaged in substantially similar anti-commerce campaigns 
with both submarines and aircraft. As the Mallison paper has indicated, the 
belligerents applied essentially similar operational definitions of the term "mer-
chant ship" as used in the London Protocol. The legitimacy of that operational 
definition was appraised, perhaps inadequately, by the International Military 
Tribunal at Nuremberg. It is suggested that, in some respects, the analysis of the 
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London Protocol and of the legitimacy of state practice by Admiral Doenitz's 
lawyer, Flottenrichter Otto Kranzbuhler, is superior to the analysis in the IMT 
judgment itsel£ 
Concerning belligerent vessels, Kranzbuhler focused on the ambiguity of the 
concept "merchant ship" and the uncertainty connected with the words "active 
resistance" in the London Protocol. Bearing in mind that ships sailing in enemy 
convoy are usually deemed to be engaged in "active resistance," he argued that 
all armed merchantmen should also be deemed to be engaged in active resistance 
as arming served the same purpose as a naval escort and as it was not possible to 
distinguish between defensive and offensive weapons. 
And this very same common sense demands also that the armed merchantman be 
held just as guilty offorcible resistance as the convoyed ship. Let us take an extreme 
instance in order to make the matter quite clear. An unarmed merchant ship of 
20,000 tons and a speed of20 knots, which is convoyed by a trawler with, let us 
say, 2 guns and a speed of 15 knots, may be sunk without warning, because it has 
placed itself under the protection of the trawler and thereby made itself guilty of 
active resistance. If, however, this same merchant ship does not have the 
protection of the trawler and instead the 2 guns, or even 4 or 6 of them, are placed 
on its decks, thus enabling it to use its full speed, should it in this case not be 
deemed just as guilty of offering active resistance as before? Such a deduction really 
seems to me against all common sense. In the opinion of the Prosecution the 
submarine would first have to give the merchant ship, which is far superior to it 
in fighting power, the order to stop and then wait until the merchant ship fires its 
first broadside at the submarine. Only then would it have the right to use its own 
weapons. Since, however a single artillery hit is nearly always fatal to a submarine 
but as a rule does very litde harm to a merchant ship, the result would be the 
almost certain destruction of the submarine.8 
He goes on to argue: 
However, another factor of greater general importance, and also of greater danger 
to the submarines, was the order to report every enemy ship in sight, giving its 
type and location. This report was destined, so said the order, to facilitate taking 
advantage of an opportunity which might never recur, to destroy the enemy by 
naval or air forces. This is an unequivocal utilization of all merchant vessels for 
military intelligence service with intent direcdy to injure the enemy. If one 
considers the fact that according to the hospital ship agreement even the immunity 
of hospital ships ceases if they relay military information of this type, then one 
need have no doubts about the consequences of such behavior on the part of a 
commercial vessel. Any craft putting out to sea with the order and intention of 
using every opportunity that occurs to send military reports about the enemy to 
its own naval and air forces is taking part in hostilities during the entire course of 
its voyage and, according to the aforementioned report of1930 of the committee 
of jurists, has no right to be considered a merchant vessel. Any different conception 
would not do justice to the immediate danger which a wireless report involves 
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for the vessel reported and which subjects it often within a few minutes, to attack 
by enemy aircraft.9 
Concerning enemy merchant vessels, he concludes: 
All of the Admiralty's directives, taken together, show that British merchant 
vessels, from the very first day of the war, closely cooperated with the British navy 
in combating the enemy's naval forces. They were part of the military com-
munications network of the British naval and air forces and their armament of 
guns and depth charges, the practical training in manipulation of the weapons, 
and the orders relative to their use, were actions taken by the British Navy. 
We consider it out of the question that a merchant fleet in this manner destined 
and utilized for combat should count among the vessels entitled to the protection 
of the London Protocol against sinking without warning. On the basis of this 
conception and in connection with the arming of all enemy merchant vessels, 
which was rapidly being completed, an order was issued on 17 October, 1939 to 
attack all enemy merchant ships without warning. to 
The IMT did, of course, accept Kranzbuhler's argument concerning bel-
ligerent merchant vessels and, although it held Doenitz not guilty for his conduct 
of submarine warfare against "British armed merchant ships," considered in 
context, the judgment actually exonerated Doenitz from responsibility for 
attacks on all belligerent merchant vessels because of the general belligerent 
practice of incorporating all such vessels into the war effort. 
Kranzbuhler's arguments were less successful where neutral vessels were 
concerned. His first argument was that all vessels, including neutral vessels, which 
sailed blacked-out in the "war area," an undefined term, were subject to attack. 
Examining the question of blacked-out vessels from the legal standpoint, 
Vanselow, the well-known expert on the law governing naval warfare, makes 
the following remark: 
In war a blacked-out vessel must in case of doubt be considered as an enemy 
warship. A neutral as well as an enemy merchant vessel navigating without light 
voluntarily renounces during the hours of darkness all claim to immunity from 
attack without being stopped. 
I furthermore refer to Churchill's declaration, made in the House of Commons, 
on 8 May 1940, concerning the action of British submarines in the Jutland area. 
Since the beginning of April they had orders to attack all German vessels without 
warning during the daytime, and all vessels, and thus all neutrals, as well, at night. 
This amounts to recognition of the legal standpoint as presented. It even goes 
beyond the German order, insofar as neutral merchant vessels navigating with all 
lights on were sunk without warning in these waters. In view of the clear legal 
aspect it would hardly have been necessary to give an express warning to neutral 
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shipping against suspicious or hostile conduct. Nevertheless, the Naval Operations 
Staff saw to it that this was done.1l 
The second danger to neutral shipping was what Kranzbuhler referred to as 
"zones of operations" and what have since been referred to as "exclusion zones. " 
He argued that the fact that such zones were not referred to in the London 
Protocol did not mean they were not permissible. Such zones constituted a 
normal part of state practice and it was open to the tribunal to find that they 
were legally permissible subject to certain criteria of reasonableness. Technology 
compelled changes in the 19th century law. 
It is a well-known fact that operational areas were originally proclaimed in the 
first World War. The first declaration of this kind came from the British 
Government on 2 November 1914, and designated the entire area of the North 
Sea as a military area. This declaration was intended as a reprisal against alleged 
Gennan violations of international law. Since this justification naturally was not 
recognized, the Imperial Government replied on 4 February 1915 by designating 
the waters around England as a military area. On both sides certain extensions 
were made subsequendy. I do not wish to go into the individual fonnulations of 
these declarations and into the judicial legal deductions which were made from 
their wording for or against the admissibility of these declarations. Whether these 
areas are designated as military area, barred zone, operational area, or danger zone, 
the point always remained that the naval forces in the area determined had 
permission to destroy any ship encountered there. After the World War the 
general conviction of naval officers and experts on international law alike was that 
the operational area would be maintained as a means of naval warfare. A 
development, typical for the rules of naval warfare, was confinned here, namely, 
that the modern technique of war forcibly leads to the use of war methods which 
at first are introduced in the guise of reprisals, but which gradually come to be 
employed without such a justification and recognized as legitimate. 
The technical reasons for such a development are obvious: [t]he improvement of 
mines made it possible to render large sea areas dangerous. But ifit was admissible 
to destroy by mines every ship sailing, despite warning, in a designated sea area, 
one could see no reason why other meam of naval warfare should not be used in 
this area in the same way. Besides, the traditional institution of the blockade 
direcdy off enemy ports and coasts by mines, submarines, and aircraft was made 
practically impossible, so that the sea powers had to look for new ways to bar the 
approach to enemy coasts. Consequendy it was these necessities which were the 
compelling factors in bringing about the recognition of the operational area. 
It is true that there was by no means a unifonn interpretation concerning the 
particular prerequisites under which the declaration of such areas would be 
considered admissible, just as there was none with regard to the designation which 
the belligerent power must choose. The conferences of 1922 and 1930 did not 
change anything either in that respect, as can be seen, for instance, from the efforts 
made after 1930, especially by American politicians and experts in international 
law, for a solution of this question. 
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Unfortunately, there is no time at my disposal to discuss these questions in detail 
and therefore it must suffice for the purposes of the defense to state that during 
the conferences in Washington in 1922 and in London in 1930 the operational 
area was an arrangement or system known to all powers concerned, which 
operated in a way determined by both sides in the first World War: that is, that 
all ships encountered in it would be subject to immediate destruction. If the 
operational area were to have been abolished in the aforementioned conferences, 
especially in the treaty of 1930, an accord should have been reached on this 
question, if not in the text of the agreement than at least in the negotiations. The 
minutes show nothing of the kind. The relationship between operational area and 
the London Agreement remained unsettled.12 
As is well known, the IMT did not accept Kranzbuhler's arguments concern-
ing operational or exclusion zones and found Doenitz's orders to sink neutral 
ships without warning in these zones a violation of the Protocol. It then went 
on to announce that no sentence would be assessed on the ground of his breaches 
of the Protocol because of similar practices by the Allied Powers,13 the only 
known successful use of the tu quoque plea in a war crimes trial. The IMT's 
condemnation of exclusion zones notwithstanding, such zones have been used 
in a number of recent conflicts.14 
Assessing the impact of the IMT judgment on the scope and applicability of 
the London Protocol is not a simple task. Professor O'Connell has attempted to 
"cut the Gordian knot" by arguing: 
The truth is that the requirements of the London Protocol are to be observed only 
in the situation where the submarine can act with minimal risk on the surface. 
Since that situation is now an ideal hardly ever in practice to be realized, one is 
compelled to draw from the Doenitz trial the conclusion that submarine opera-
tions in time of war are today governed by no legal text, and that no more than 
lipservice is being paid in naval documents to the London Protocol. 15 
There is some basis for arguing that the London Protocol was drafted in favor 
of surface naval powers, particularly Great Britain, as a fall back position after 
efforts to outlaw the employment of submarines in a commerce destruction role 
had failed and as an attempt to neutralize the effectiveness of the submarine in 
such a role. The Protocol, if it is given a literal interpretation, is virtually 
unworkable in a general war between naval powers where one side has a 
substantial preponderance in surface naval strength because it does not confer 
substantially equal benefits to both sides. The practical effectiveness of the law 
of war in a particular conflict is conditional upon, among other factors, a crude 
reciprocity and rough equivalence of benefits. 
The key to a workable interpretation of the London Protocol lies in 
determining the proper meaning of the undefined term "merchant vessel" in 
that document. In a general war, the true merchant vessel is rarely to be found 
because the belligerent states normally assume such a degree of control over their 
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own vessels and neutral vessels engaged in trading with them as to convert them 
into de focto naval auxiliaries. As de facto naval auxiliaries they should be subject 
to the same treatment as de jure naval auxiliaries, that is, they may be sunk on sight 
outside of neutral waters. Even in a general war, however, there may be genuine 
neutral traffic which is entitled to proceed unmolested. For example, in World 
War II, before the USSR declared war onJapan in 1945, there was a significant 
neutral merchant traffic to and from the Pacific coast of the USSR which passed 
through the US declared Pacific War Zone and was not molested by U.S. Navy 
submarines. In a war more limited than that ofW orld War II, for example Korea 
or the Falklands, many merchant vessels, even those of the contending parties, 
will be engaged in normal trade quite unconnected with the war effort. 
Such merchant vessels are clearly not de facto naval auxiliaries. As such they 
are entitled to all of the benefits of the London Protocol. In other words, this 
writer finds the analysis of the London Protocol in the Mallison paper quite 
persuasive. 
Considered in conjunction, the London Protocol, the state practice of the 
Second World War, and the Nuremberg response indicate that cargo carrying 
vessels may, under the law of naval warfare, constitute legitimate military 
objectives in some circumstances when they are not sailing under convoy or 
actively resisting visit and search. An interpretation of the London Protocol 
which suggested that all cargo carrying vessels are merchant vessels and therefore 
exempt from attack would appear to be unduly simplistic. The problem is, 
however, where do we go from there? Do we assume that World War II was 
sui generis? Do we assume that cargo carrying vessels do not constitute legitimate 
military objectives unless they are operated under a system which meets all of 
the Nuremberg indicia? The system approach is one we in Canada have been 
thinking about for our Canadian Forces Law of Armed Conflict Manual. Our 
current draft indicates that enemy merchant vessels may be attacked and 
destroyed if they are incorporated into the belligerent war effort. A decision 
concerning whether or not enemy merchant vessels may be generally deemed 
to be incorporated into the belligerent war effort will be made at the governmen-
tal level. Indicators that all enemy merchant shipping is incorporated into the 
belligerent war effort include: 
a) state control over merchant shipping to ensure that only items essential to the 
war effort are imported or exported; 
b) general use of convoys; 
c) general integration of merchant vessels into intelligence networks by, for 
example, requiring reports of sighting of all enemy vessels or aircraft; 
d) standing instructions to resist submarines by ramming; and 
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e) anning of merchant vessels. 
This approach is probably broad enough to encompass the main categories 
of enemy merchant ships attacked during the unrestricted submarine warfare 
campaigns of the two World Wars. It should be noted that the approach in our 
Draft Manual may be too restrictive, however, as it does not include neutral 
merchant ships incorporated in the belligerent war effort as military objectives. 
One might suggest that the unconvoyed neutral tankers which transported the 
oil essential to the Iranian war economy and were attacked by Iraq constituted 
legitimate military objectives. Is there a valid legal reason for distinguishing 
between neutral and enemy merchant ships on the basis offlag alone when they 
are functionally indistinguishable? 
As every naval lawyer knows, it is extremely difficult to provide accurate, 
simple bright line legal rules concerning the targeting of merchant shipping. 
Although the task is difficult, we still have a professional obligation to provide 
as accurate an assessment of the law as we are capable of, and to make that 
assessment as clear as possible for our clients. We must also ensure that we do 
not merely indulge in a creative labeling approach whereby "our side has 
merchant vessels which are exempt from attack while theirs has naval auxiliaries 
which we can sink on sight." The task of developing a usable word picture to 
describe when the merchant ship becomes a legitimate military objective has 
merely been begun. We in Canada have tended to use the expression "incor-
poration into the belligerent war effort." The Mallison paper uses expressions 
such as "performing belligerent functions" or "participation in the anned 
conflict." NWP 9 uses expressions such as "acting in any capacity as a naval or 
military auxiliary" and "integrated into the war-fighting/war sustaining effort." 
The Bochum Conference on the Military Objective in the Law of Naval Warfare 
used the expression "making an effective contribution to military effort." All of 
these expressions are useful starting points. It is essential, however, that we now 
begin to fill in the details of our word picture. 
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